The article discusses sexual violence by ISIS against women in Iraq, particularly 
interest displayed by the media, policy makers and the general public with respect to the broad continuum of sexual and gender-based violence in present day Iraq, but also prior to the appearance of ISIS in Iraq. As feminist IR scholars like Cynthia Enloe (1987, 1990, 2000) , Cynthia Cockburn (1999 Cockburn ( , 2004 Cockburn ( , 2007 and Annick T.R. Wibben (2004 Wibben ( , 2011 amongst others, have argued, we need to recognise a continuum of violence before and after conflict and wars and from the personal/household to the international. More concretely, perpetrators of sexual and gendered violence exist on a broad spectrum in Iraq, including militia linked to the Iraqi government and other political parties, various insurgent groups who fought against the government and the former occupation, criminal gangs, family members and, until a few years ago, also the occupation forces. In what follows, I will argue that it is important to historicise and contextualise the extreme forms of sexual violence associated with ISIS, not in order to belittle its scale and detrimental consequences but to deepen our understanding about its roots, context and ways to tackle it. With my article I aim to intervene in recent feminist debates of how to approach and explain sexual violence in relation to the Middle East, while also paying attention to the various ways that sexual violence has been instrumentalised by a range of relevant constituencies and political actors. On a broader level, my intention here is to contribute to the discussions about challenges for transnational feminist politics. 
Intersectional positionality
I am frequently faced with a conundrum when talking about sexual violence in Iraq.
Sexual violence is rampant. There is no question about it. However, also widespread is the political instrumentalization of sexual violence, often sensationalised and exaggerated in terms of scope and threat. It is used as an othering and dehumanizing device, whether in relation to sectarian conflict, the fraud and complex relations between western and Middle Eastern political leaders, or the demonization of asylum seekers and migrants. For example, those of us living in Europe are familiar with the obsessive discussions of honour crimes in the European politics of immigration.
Without doubt honour-based crimes and killings are a serious problem, particularly in relation to the Kurdish region and Kurdish diaspora communities in Europe (Alinia, 2013; Beghikani, 2005 Beghikani, , 2010 Mojab 2001 Mojab , 2003 (Seikaly & Mikdashi, 2012; Malik, 2012 ). Yet, despite my own reservations of the packaging, content and tone of El Tahawy's article, I felt uncomfortable with the lack of serious attempts to look inward, name and confront those attitudes, norms, practices and relations that can not be simply explained away by external and structural patterns, forces and processes. I would argue that this dichotomous approach -focusing on patriarchal cultural attitudes and practices on the one hand and imperialist policies and neo-liberal economics on the other -is unhelpful and more reflective of specific, and often quite divergent, positionalities rather than the complex empirical realities we are facing as activists and academics.
Obviously I cannot escape my positionality and audiences, being based in London, which comes with certain responsibilities and points of emphasis. Yet, rather than contributing to the taboo and silencing of sexual and wider gender-based violence within domestic Iraqi politics on the one hand, and the sensationalising and essentialist culturalist discourses on the other, we need to find nuanced and truly intersectional ways to talk about it. Trying to avoid the straightjacket of location and positionality -however shifting that might be given people's multiple roles, (Efrati, 2012) . We also have to look carefully at the specific political and economic dynamics linked to the Kurdish Regional Government, particularly post -1991.
Sexual violence during the Ba'th regime
Despite its repressive nature, the first decade of the Ba‗th regime has been largely characterised by its secularising and modernizing policies. Women's education and labour force participation were integral to the regime's attempt at creating a productive population that could be governed through the centralised mechanisms of an increasingly authoritarian state. I have elsewhere discussed at length the state's active intervention in challenging prevailing gender norms and relations, largely to address the expanding economy and needs of the labour market (Al-Ali, 2007).
Women's education and labour force participation was actively encouraged by the state which, throughout the 1970s and 80s, provided free childcare and an infrastructure that facilitated women's entry into the expanding labour force (ibid.).
An in-depth analysis of the 35 years of Ba‗th regime does point to contradictory and changing policies and attitude towards women and gender, challenging any and generalised and often simplistic assessments.
Clearly women living in urban areas not involved in opposition politics benefitted much more from the modernizing state policies than either women in the country- From the 1980s onwards, in the context of the Iran-Iraq war and the atrocities against the Kurdish population, women were increasingly used to demarcate boundaries between communities and carry the heavy burden of honour in a society that became more and more militarized. Women's patriotic duties shifted to producers of loyal Iraqi citizens and future fighters. Their bodies became progressively the sight of nationalist policies and battles (Rohde, 2010) . During the Iraq-Iran war (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) , a series of legal decrees were introduced to control women's marital and reproductive freedoms. In December 1982, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) issued a decree forbidding Iraqi women to marry non-Iraqis as well as another decree prohibiting Iraqi women married to non-Iraqis to transfer money or property to their husbands as inheritance (Omar, 1994: 63) . At the same time, Iraqi men were encouraged to divorce their Iranian wives while Iraqi Arab men were encouraged to marry Kurdish women as part of the regime's Arabization policies in the north.
During this period, Islamist and Kurdish women were tortured and sexually abused, humiliating not only the female victims but ‗dishonouring' their male relatives as well (Al-Ali, 2007: 168-169) .
The most known systematic killing but also sexual abuse took place during the 1987- Layla, as many other Iraqi women activists I talked to over the years, acknowledges that sexual violence took place during the Ba‗th regime. Yet, at the same time, she questions the timing and the way that American and British politicians and the media started to focus on sexual violence in the aftermath of 9/11 and in the run up to the invasion. However, a handful of women whom I interviewed shortly after the invasion vehemently denied the atrocities committed against Kurds by the Iraqi regime and Iraqi soldiers. It was not always clear to me whether they genuinely believed that these atrocities did not happen but it seemed to me that they had willingly bought into regime propaganda despite the fact that a large part of the population seemed to have been aware that the regime's rhetoric was not to be trusted. women's rights activists and female MPs to make some headway in relation to the legal protection of women and the criminalization of gender-based violence. Yet, as Begikhani (2005 Begikhani ( , 2010 and others have pointed out, in reality the KRG appears to be less invested in actually implementing new legislation and tends to pursue more traditional ways of addressing gender-based and sexual violence, using tribal and family dispute mechanisms, often to the detriment of women receiving justice.
Despite the generally more secular and progressive context in comparison to central and southern Iraq, one cannot help but notice the way that Kurdish politicians instrumentalise gender issues.
Several authors have discussed and analysed gender-based and sexual violence in the KRI with reference to patriarchy, tribal culture, nationalism, militarism and Islamism (Mojab, 2001 (Mojab, , 2004 Beghikani 2005 Beghikani , 2010 . More recently, Minoo Alinia (2013) has provided an in-depth analysis of honour-based crimes, paying attention to the way that various power structures intersect to produce a -hegemonic honour discourse‖.
Looking at the intersections of ethnic and national oppression, economic marginalization, patriarchy, religion, tribal and kinship structures as well as One woman told Amnesty International that she went to a place where she thought she would be receiving medical care for her panic attacks, but instead found a television crew wanting to interview her. Two others said that they received a visit from a foreign man who said he was a doctor, but seemed to be a journalist: -He said that to cure our depression we should get out of the house and go for walks in the fields and sit in the sun. He had a large video camera and filmed us but said that our faces would not be shown.‖ Three other girls who received the visit of a television crew while they were being interviewed by an Amnesty
International researcher said that they did not want to speak to journalists but that they felt they could not refuse because the family who hosted This specific context, I would argue is radically different from the air strikes on ISIS targets in Syria more broadly. Not only is the prolonged military intervention in Syria contributing to the massive scale of human casualties and displaced people, thereby potentially increasing the radicalization of people, but also the nature of the Syrian conflict is also far more complex. In the wider Syrian context, targeted air strikes on specific ISIS targets are far less likely than they were in ISIS-occupied Kobane in Rojava (northern Syria or western Kurdistan). Meanwhile, the opposition to ISIS is also extremely heterogeneous, including many radical Islamist, highly misogynist and violent militia and armed groups. Finally, the current ill-conceived military intervention in Syria appears to ignore the main source of most human casualties and violence in the current conflict, which is the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
There are many other concrete points that a transnational feminist solidarity can and suggestions, I still hold that a dose of ambivalence, humility and doubt has to be integral to any transnational feminist solidarity at these troubling times.
Notes one specific continuum of GBV that refers to a wide range of threats, behaviours and acts that are sexual or sexualized, unwanted and committed without consent. Sexual violence might exist on an individual level but is often used more systematically to control, dominate and reinforce gender-based oppression and heteronormativity.
